Bimodal Conceptual Realism

1. Conceptual realism is the claim that the reality we represent or describe, no less than its conceptual appearance (Kant) in discursive acts and doxastic attitudes, is always already in conceptual shape (is conceptually contentful), reference-independently of discursive practice.
2. A non-psychological conception of conceptual content is role in relations of implication (or consequence) and incompatibility.
3. Bimodal conceptual realism understands relations of consequence and incompatibility (and so the conceptual contents that stand in those relations) as being of two kinds (as specifiable in two kinds of metavocabulary): deontic normative and alethic modal. It is *inappropriate* (out of bounds) to make incompatible claims, and it is *impossible* for the objective world to exhibit incompatible facts.

| | Conceptual Representings (Appearance) of Nonconceptual Representeds (Reality) | Conceptual Realism: Representings (Appearance) and Representeds (Reality) Both Conceptual |
|---|---|---|
| Conceptual Psychologism: Only Representings Conceptual | **Transcendental Idealism (Kant**, also Sellars**)** | **Subjective Idealism (Berkeley)** |
| Structural Conception of the Conceptual | ? | **Absolute Idealism (Hegel**, also Spinoza**)** |

Normative Pragmatics:

4. Discursive practice as such involves reasoning. For in addition to accepting and rejecting what is expressed by declarative sentences, interlocutors must be able both to *defend* and to *challenge* the rational credentials of those stances or practical attitudes.
5. Defending (the credentials of) a claiming is producing further claimings that provide reasons *for* the acceptance or rejection being challenged. Challenging (the credentials of) a claiming is producing further claimings that provide reasons *against* the acceptance or rejection being challenged.
6. If accepting A functions practically as a reason *to accept* B, then A provides a reason *for* B, and if accepting A functions practically as a reason *to reject* B then A provides a reason *against* B. Reason relations are relations that one set of claimables stands in to another when the first consists of reasons for or against the other.

7.  We can call these reason relations "implication" and "incompatibility." To give a reason *for* is to commit oneself to accept premises that *imply* the claimable a reason is being given for. To give a reason *against* is to commit oneself to accept premises that are *incompatible* with the claimable a reason is being given against.

8.  Γ implies A (Γ|~A) just in case commitment to accept everything in the premise-set Γ precludes entitlement to *reject* A.

9.  Γ is incompatible with (rules out) A (Γ#A) just in case commitment to accept everything in premise-set Γ precludes entitlement to *accept* A.

10. Any set of commitments that *precludes entitlement* to *reject* A thereby *implicitly* commits one to *accept* A.

11. Any set of commitments that *precludes entitlement* to *accept* A thereby *implicitly* commits one to *reject* A.

12. Restall-Ripley normative bilateral pragmatic reading of implication: Γ |~ A iff any position that includes accepting all of Γ and rejecting A is normatively incoherent or "out of bounds": one cannot be entitled to such a constellation of commitments.


Truth-Maker Semantics (Kit Fine):

13. Metaphysics I: A universe of *states* and their mereological *fusions* into states containing them. They are partitioned into *possible* and *impossible* states.

14. Semantics: An interpretation function assigns each declarative sentence to a pair of sets of states, thought of as the (exact) *truth*-makers and *falsity*-makers of that sentence.

15. Metaphysics II: Although there are not enough sentences to express them all, the objective world contains *propositions*, in the form of pairs of sets of states that *could* be the truth-makers and falsity-makers of sentences.

16. Truth-maker semantics is not just *modally* realist, but *conceptually* realist according to the Sellars-inspired non-psychological conception of the conceptual as functional role w/res to relations of consequence and incompatibility.

17. Ulf Hlobil's version of consequence (implication) in truth-maker semantics: Γ |~ A iff any fusion of a state that verifies all the members of Γ with a state that falsifies A is an impossible state.

18. Restall-Ripley normative pragmatic reading of implication: Γ |~ A iff any position that includes accepting all of Γ and rejecting A is normatively incoherent or "out of bounds"—as we have read it: one cannot be entitled to such a constellation of commitments.

19. Γ # A ⇔ the state resulting from *fusion* of any *verifiers* of all the members of Γ with any *verifier* of A is an *impossible* state,

20. Γ # A ⇔ the position resulting from *concomitant commitment* to *accept* all of Γ and to *accept* A is normatively *incoherent* ("out of bounds")—a constellation of commitments to which one *cannot* be entitled (entitlement is precluded).

Bimodal Isomorphism:

21.  Ulf Hlobil:  The reason relations of implication and incompatibility defined by the Restall-Ripley bilateral normative pragmatics and the reason relations of implication and incompatibility defined by Kit Fine's truth-maker alethic modal semantics (when both are suitably tweaked) are *identical* up to isomorphism.  The deontic normative reason relations articulating discursive representings determine *exactly the same* conceptual contents as the alethic modal reason relations articulating the objective represented world of states.

22. Spinoza: "The order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of things."

23. Isomorphism is at the level of reason relations, that is, meanings—the relations that functionally define (cf. Sellarsian "meaning as functional classification") conceptual contents =rational forms)—not at the level of truth of sentences.  For it only constrains, but is in no way constituted by, correlations between (sets of) *actual* states and *true* sentences.  The idea of "coherence theories of truth" was always later misunderstandings of *holistic* theories of *meaning*.  But now we see that "correspondence theories of truth" were *also really* about holistic theories of meaning.

24. Q: What is the source of the deontic-pragmatic alethic-semantic isomorphism—and so of the institution of the shared conceptual contents or rational forms that are roles w/res to the common conceptual structure?
A: It is the product of a distinctive *process* and *practice*:
the practice of applying *empirical descriptive* **concepts**.
    These, it will be recalled from last week, are concepts expressed by locutions whose use is both *normatively governed* by the states described and which *epistemically tracks* those states.  The first is a deontic normative relation between languagings and worldly states, and the second is a subjunctively robust alethic modal relation between languagings and worldly states.

25. The effect of using empirical descriptive concepts subject to these paired normative and alethic constraints is to refine and improve the fit of reason relations among doxastic attitudes and the reason relations among sets of worldly states: to sand off the rough edges where they do not coincide.
    Note that this process grooms and improves *both* the doxastic commitments interlocutors become entitled to *and* the reason relations articulating the norms that govern their use.

26. The distinction between what is expressed in deontic and alethic modal metavocabularies comes into the story *twice*:

    i.      Articulating the difference between the *pragmatic* and *semantic* forms of conceptual contents, characterizing represent*ings* and represent*eds*, and

    ii.     Articulating the two dimensions of the process by which empirical descriptive locutions come to be normatively governed by and epistemically track what they describe.